Toward Common Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia—Challenges, Opportunities, and New Visions  by Moon, Chung-in
1877-0428 © 2010 Beijing Forum. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
doi:10.1016/j.sbspro.2010.05.122
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 7560–7569
Selected Papers of Beijing Forum 2004 
Toward Common Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia—
Challenges, Opportunities, and New Visionsi 
Chung-in Moon 
Chairman, the Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative, Office of the President, ROK 
Professor of Political Science, Yonsei University 
I Introduction 
It has elapsed more than a decade since the demolition of the Berlin Wall, the dismantling of the Soviet Union, 
and the breakdown of the East European socialist system paved the way to the advent of post-Cold War era. Logic 
of bi-polarity, that had governed international politics since the end of the Second World War, has waned, 
precipitating profound global transformations. Such changes have accompanied uneven impacts on peace and 
security.  Although outbreak of ethnic conflicts has occasionally tarnished its image of peace and security, Europe as 
a whole has greatly benefited from structural realignments of security order in post-Cold War era. The formation of 
European Union, NATO’s expanding sphere of influence, and tamed behavior by potential spoilers such as Russia 
all portend the arrival of stable peace in Europe. Meanwhile, the East Asian region presents a rather contrasting 
outlook.  Lifting the Cold War overlay has not yet produced the structure of enduring peace. Delicate overlapping of 
the Cold War and post-Cold War security structure and the precarious transitional dynamics of peace and conflict 
have heightened concerns over the future of security in East Asia.  
At the heart of the East Asian security problematique lies the Korean conflict. Although the Korean conflict was 
a product of the Cold War, its demise has not terminated the protracted conflict on the Korean peninsula. The 
historic North-South Korean summit on June 13-15, 2000 notwithstanding, Korea is still far from achieving 
meaningful confidence-building, arms control, and inter-Korean peace-building. Apart from the Korean conflict, the 
old U.S.- Soviet rivalry has been gradually replaced by a new regional rivalry between China and the United States. 
Its sheer size, economic dynamism, and military build-up, along with acute military tension across the Taiwan strait, 
have turned China into a major source of regional insecurity, be it real or contrived. Continuing U.S. regional 
security commitment and forward deployment of its forces represent another significant token of the volatile nature 
of regional security dynamics. While continuation of American security commitment could serve as the most 
credible backbone of region’s strategic stability, its disengagement could result in nightmarish outcomes such as 
power vacuum in the region, Japan’s remilitarization, Chinese hegemonic ambition, and fierce intra-regional arms 
races.ii Likewise, the future of regional order and peace-building in East Asia seems precarious and uncertain.  
Against the backdrop of these observations, this paper attempts to look into security dynamics of the region and 
to suggest viable options for building durable and stable peace. The first section presents an analytical overview of 
regional order and peace-building, while the second addresses empirical dimensions of regional insecurity. The third 
section examines three contending paradigms of East Asian peace and security: realist status quo, liberal transition, 
and constructivist pessimism. Finally, the paper suggests liberal constructivism as a viable option for building a 
community of security, stable peace, and common prosperity in the region. 
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II Regional Order and Peace-building: Three Pathways 
What is regional order? The concept of regional order is quite ambiguous, and its definitions vary by different 
schools of thought. iii  But it can be defined as “a formal or informal arrangement that sustains rule-governed 
interactions among states in their pursuit of individual and collective goals” in a specific region.iv This definition of 
regional order presupposes three elements. The first element is the idea of patterned regularity.v Formal or informal 
arrangements of principles, rules, habits, and institutions facilitate countries in the region to behave in patterned 
ways. Andanticipation of patterned behavior in turn generates reciprocal reaction by other actors in the region. Such 
patterned regularity reduces chances for disorder and uncertainty. Second, reciprocal interactions and resulting 
patterned regularity are by and large a product of rule-governed behavior. Patterned regularity would be 
inconceivable without corresponding rule-governed behavior. Compliance with principles, norms, and rules not only 
prevents any deviant behavior, but also creates and enhances purposive order.vi Finally, the purposive regional order 
is in turn predicated on satisfaction of normative conditions for co-existence of actors in the region. They involve 
not only the reduction of likelihood of regional violence, but also the creation of minimally acceptable conditions of 
economic well-being, social justice, ecological stability, and participation in decision-making in the region. vii 
How to achieve regional order? Pathways to regional order also differ bycontending theoretical perspectives. 
Realists argue that regional order is a function of power.viii Depending upon configuration of power, regional order 
can take several forms: anarchical, hierarchical, balance of power, consortium, or hegemonic. Anarchical regional 
order, which resembles the Hobbsean world of all against all, is rather rare in reality. However, diffused power, 
deformed governance structure, and individual maximizing behavior for power, wealth, and status can often lead to 
anarchical regional order. The only viable rule under the anarchical order is the survival for the fittest. Actors in the 
region can avoid violence and instability associated with the anarchical order by resorting to balance of power. But 
balance of power cannot guarantee stable peace either because of fluidity of power embedded in power transition 
among states and the dynamics of alliance politics.ix 
Hierarchical form of regional order involves a differential arrangement of regional actors, depending upon their 
power and influence. Tributary system or patron-client relationships are classical examples of hierarchical regional 
order. Although the tributary system is no longer available, hierarchical structuration of patron-client relationships 
can be found in various forms of alliance ties. Consortium form of regional order refers to collective management of 
regional security and economic order. As the Concert of Power in the post-Napoleonic era illustrates, such regional 
arrangement can be undertaken through mutual consultation and consensus among major powers. Finally, 
hegemonic order can be envisaged. It can be either benign or malignant.  While benign hegemonic regional order 
refers to regional security and economic arrangements in which a hegemonic leader provides collective goods for 
the survival and prosperity of regional actors, the malignant one can be defined as a regional order in which a 
hegemonic leader engages in the practice of domination and subjugation. The malignant hegemonic order often 
involves the imposition of imperial order on the regional scale. 
Liberals and constructivists, however, suggest alternative views of regional order.  Liberals argue that regional 
order can evolve into several diverse forms, depending upon the configuration of interests and norms, not power. 
Actors in the region can show rule-governed behavior not only because of salience of gain from patterned regularity 
and cooperation,x  but also because of norms, practices, and even institutional inertia.xi Following the founding spirit 
of the United Nations, countries in the region can attempt to form a collective security system that can overcome 
deficiencies of alliance system. Collective security system, a regional order which is based on collective identity 
transcending parochial individual interests, can surely be conducive to building and sustaining stable peace.  Or 
regional regimes can be created and maintained in order to govern security behavior of regional actors. Recent 
debates on the creation of multilateral security cooperation regimes at the regional level exemplify this aspect.  
Although regional security regimes might be weaker than collective security system in enforcement of common 
security and peace, they can be more desirable options than military deterrence and alliance politics in making and 
building peace. Some liberals would go beyond this. According to them, viable and sustaining regional order cannot 
be achieved without inducing internal transformation of regional actors. In this regard, adoption of market economy 
and democracy becomes an essential element of forming a community of security.xii The ultimate liberal vision is 
the creation of total regional integration evolving from free trade area, common market, economic union, and 
currency union into political integration.  
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However, liberal prescriptions alone might not be able to form a viable regional order. Internal structural 
transformation, provision of liberal trends, and subsequent regional arrangement of liberal institutions are necessary, 
but insufficient, conditions for the creation of viable regional order. As constructivists argue, institutions are nothing 
but a reflection of interests and identity in their social totality. xiiiThus, failure to address identity and inter-subjective 
understanding of its historical formation and behavioral manifestation, while accounting for interests, is bound to 
entail lack of authentic cooperation among actors in the region. For identity is as important as power and interests in 
shaping and sustaining regional order. Identity and collective memory of historical past are crucial variables in 
forging shared values and common goals vital to the formation of community of security. It is simply because most 
countries in a given region are usually inflicted with fractured pain of the past. It is virtually inconceivable for them 
to engage in practices of cooperation without first healing the fractured pain and then recognizing and respecting 
identity of others.xiv In view of this, the constructivist approach does not offer specific visions of regional order, but 
points to the relative importance of collective identity in constructing liberal regional order such as collective 
security system or regional security regimes. 
As with regional order, peace-building is an elusive term. Peace-building can be best defined as efforts to create 
conditions that make war unlikely. Thus, peace-building is more generic, encompassing, and structural than peace-
keeping or peace-making. Peace-keeping is generally designed to prevent or suppress conflicts through military 
deterrence or third party intervention such as the dispatch of United Nations peace-keeping forces, while peace-
making involves the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that arrange 
an end to a dispute.xv Thus, peace-building is concerned more about the structural foundation of creating stable 
peace that refers to “the absence of preparation for war or the serious expectation of war.”xvi In this sense, peace-
building should be differentiated from traditional techniques of conflict suppression (deterrence) and regulation 
(CBMs and arms control) that aim at managing unstable or negative peace. 
As noted before briefly, there are three distinctive ways to peace building that can ensure the absence of 
preparation for war or the serious expectation of war. The first is the spread of free market mechanism. As 
commercial liberals argue, deepening intra-regional market interdependence can reduce the likelihood of war, while 
enhancing chances for peace.xvii  For expansion of markets create vested commercial interests across border who 
would oppose the outbreak of war that can undermine their wealth. The second is to satisfy conditions suggested by 
republican liberals.xviii According to them, republican (democratic) polity can prevent war because it can assure 
openness, transparency, and domestic check and balance in the management of foreign and defense policy. As Bruce 
Russet observes through extensive empirical works, democracies do not fight each other (e.g., OECD members). 
xixThus, enlarging democracy becomes the essential precondition for stable peace. Finally, as an extension of 
capitalist and democratic peace, forming a community of security can be another prerequisite for building stable 
peace. Market economy and democratic polity can foster the formation of a community of security through shared 
norms and values, common domestic institutions, and high levels of interdependence.xx Ideally speaking, such 
community building can be ultimately linked to the formation of world federation which Immanuel Kant envisaged 
long ago.  At the regional level, a community of security can be manifested in terms of several forms of regional 
order such as collective security system, multilateral security cooperation regimes, or total regional integration. 
What then are the relationships between regional order and peace-building? It is not easy to establish causal links 
between the two. However, several analytical insights can be deduced. First, realist prescriptions such as anarchical, 
balance of power, hierarchical, or hegemonic regional order can be useful for peace-keeping and peace-making, but 
are not suitable for assuring the process of regional peace-building. While anarchy reduces chances for peace-
building, hierarchical or hegemonic order violates the principles of stable peace by deepening domination and 
subjugation among actors in the region.  Balance of power involves constant efforts to maintain equilibrium through 
strengthening of national power and alliance. But it is inherently unstable because of disequilibrium embedded in its 
own system. Consortium form of regional order could be more desirable than balance of power since major players 
are all involved through mutual consultation and consensus. Nevertheless, it is also flawed since it cannot assure 
peace-building, while facilitating peace-keeping and peace-making. As the European Concert of Power 
demonstrates, it is big power-centered, by and large ignoring interests and preferences of weaker actors in the region. 
Judged on this, power-based realist prescriptions might not be suited for building regional peace. 
Second, liberal prescriptions to regional order seem more appealing. Such regional arrangements as open 
regionalism, regional security cooperation regimes, and collective security system can expedite the process of intra-
regional peace-building.  As noted before, however, the liberal regional arrangements cannot be undertaken without 
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first satisfying preconditions suggested by commercial liberals and republican liberals.  In other words, capitalist 
peace and democratic peace are the most important prerequisites of regional peace-building. Spread of market 
economy and democracy can promote regional homogeneity by enhancing ideological, political, and institutional 
similarities among regional actors. Such convergence increases the likelihood of the formation of a viable 
community of security as well as a fuller intra-regional integration, both of which can ultimately facilitate building 
and sustaining stable peace. 
Finally, it should be kept in mind that liberal institutional arrangements associated with a community of security 
and full integrative schemes do not automatically lead to peace-building. In order to build a stable peace, increase in 
mutual gains through such liberal arrangements and subsequently heightened spirits of cooperation should be 
matched with shared norms and values as well as inter-subjective understanding and recognition of mutual identity. 
Liberal institutional arrangements alone cannot guarantee peace and stability in the region without cultivating a 
feeling of co-variance and communitarian ethos among regional actors. Thus, the constructivist task of bridging 
fragmented and even hostile identities among peoples and nation-states in the region becomes an integral part of 
regional peace-building.  
 III Peace and Security in East Asia—An Empirical Overview 
Peace and security in East Asia have shown cyclical patterns. Until the late 14th century, East Asia was 
characterized by an anarchical order where ceaseless inter-state conflicts as well as domination and subjugation by 
force frequented. China was strong, but failed to consolidate hegemonic domination over its peripheral states, 
resulting in numerous military conflicts with them. From the late 14th to late 19th century, however, the East Asian 
region enjoyed a relatively long peace owing to the hierarchical regional order. During this period, sporadic conflicts 
notwithstanding, power and cultureenabled China to project its hegemonic power over the region. The Confucian 
notion of cultural hierarchy, backed up by its sheer power, facilitated legitimacy of its regional governance through 
the tributary system, pacifying the entire region.xxi  The hierarchical order was, however, shattered by the ascension 
of Japanese imperial power. Japan imposed a naked hegemonic order of the Greater East Asian Sphere of Co-
prosperity through military invasion and territorial conquest. The Japanese hegemonic order did not last long, 
however. Its defeat in the Pacific War led to the rise of contending hegemonic actors, the United States and the 
Soviet Union. Being governed by the logic of bi-polarity, the region was divided between the two spheres of 
influence, American and Soviet, where ideological and strategic contestation was intertwined and deepened. 
The Cold War did not last long either. Dismantling of the Soviet Union brought to an abrupt end to the Cold War 
in the late 1980s. Nevertheless, its end did not bring about much anticipated peace and security in East Asia. On the 
contrary, the East Asian region has become much more unstable due to confluence of old and new sources of 
conflicts.  While old inertia of the Cold War remains intact, new sources of conflicts have been on the rise.  Indeed, 
East Asia suffers from an array of actual and potential conflicts. 
Despite the end of the Cold War, the Korean peninsula still remains as the flashpoint of East Asia. Perhaps, it is 
the only area where legacies of the Cold War are most visibly engraved. The Korean summit in June, 2000 greatly 
contributed to reducing tension on the Korean peninsula through increased exchanges and cooperation in the 
economic, cultural, and social arenas. There have also been some encouraging signs of tension reduction, evidenced 
through the ban on propaganda warfare along the DMZ, the first inter-Korean defense ministerial talk, and the 
partial removal of mines in the DMZ for the reconstruction of the Seoul-Shinuiju railway system. However, military 
confidence-building, arms control and reduction, and peace-building are far from being realized. Both Koreas still 
consider each other enemies, and no significant changes can be detected in their strategic doctrines, force structure, 
and deployment patterns.  North Korea maintains its offensive deployment posture along the DMZ, and is known to 
have engaged in massive military maneuvers since the June summit, heightening security concerns of South Korea 
and the United States. South Korea has not modified its security posture either. Defense budgets have remained by 
and large intact, and the planned acquisition of FX, SAM-X, AWACS, and Aegis is being implemented without any 
interruption or delay.xxii It is an irony to observe contradictory postures of North and South Korea in their military 
planning. Both emphasize and anticipate peaceful co-existence through the summit, but they are not willing to 
compromise their security posture, symbolizing a classical security dilemma in the transition from war to peace. 
Transforming the armistice treaty into an inter-Korean peace treaty system will pose a more complex and 
daunting challenge. South Korea is not a legal party to the armistice treaty because of its refusal to sign it in 1953. 
7564  Chung-in Moon / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 2 (2010) 7560–7569 
Only North Korea, the United States, and China are de jureparties to the treaty, with the United States representing 
the United Nations Command. Thus, dismantling the armistice treaty involves complex legal processes which North 
and South Korea cannot resolve solely through the principle of self-determination. Transformation of the inter-
Korean peace treaty should be resolved in a forum other than bilateral negotiations, and the Four Party Talks could 
be a more desirable venue since it can be mediated and guaranteed by China and the United States. However, such 
efforts could contradict North Korea’s intention to sign a bilateral peace treaty directly with the United States ahead 
of the dismantling of the armistice treaty. Hence, inter-Korean peace-building is a much more complicated task than 
commonly thought of, and it would be difficult to envisage peace and security on the Korean peninsula without 
undergoing the process of tension reduction, confidence-building measures, and arms control and reduction.xxiii 
Weapons of mass destruction and missiles is another unresolved issue area. The United States worked hard to 
resolve these issues since 1994 in close coordination with Japan and South Korea, and produced some positive 
results, such as the suspension and increased transparency of North Korea’s nuclear program through the Geneva 
Agreed Framework and moratorium on development, test-launching, and exports of missiles through bilateral 
negotiations between North Korea and the U.S. But dispute over the highly enriched uranium between North Korea 
and the United States and a sequence of brinkmanship diplomacy since October 2002 revived the specter of nuclear 
crisis on the Korean peninsula. Despite a series of diplomatic negotiations through the Six Party Talks, which were 
mediated by China, the nuclear standoff continues. Failure to produce negotiated outcomes through peaceful, 
diplomatic means could result in nuclear proliferation in the region or military escalation. Both developments can 
result in a catastrophic outlook.xxiv A series of negotiations with North Korea over the missile question have not yet 
produced any tangible outcomes. Moreover, the Bush administration’s plan to develop the Missile Defense (MD) 
system in East Asia can further complicate the situation,xxv since it is by and large predicated on treatment of North 
Korea and China as actual or potential threats. 
In addition,the East Asian region is littered with unresolved territorial disputes, which could flare up into major 
escalations. Disputes over Spratly (Nansha) archipelago,the Paracel (Xisha) Islands, the Tiaoyu Islands are cases in 
point. Another unresolved case is the dispute between Japan and Russia over four islands off the northeastern tip of 
Hokkaido, Etorofu, Kunashiri, Habomai, and Shikotan. These four islands, which are part of the Kuril chain, used to 
belong to Japan’s northern territories until 1945. But after the Pacific War, the Soviet Union took over these islands 
as part of war spoils by citing wartime agreements at Yalta. Japan never agreed with this Soviet claim by arguing 
that there is no clear provision on the four islands in the Yalta agreement and that more importantly it did not 
participate in the meeting and therefore, cannot recognize Soviet entitlement to the four islands. The  Soviet Union 
was willing to hand over the two southern islands (Habomai and Shikotan), but Japan refused to accept them unless 
the Soviet Union returns all of the four islands. Russian leadership might be interested in returning the four islands 
to Japan for financial compensation. However, given that Slavic nationalism is tied to Russian power projection in 
the Russian Far East, such territorial compromise might not be easy. Disputes over Japan’s northern territories might 
not trigger any major conflicts between Japan and Russia, but could become a major source of regional insecurity. It 
is so more because of increasing inter-state fishery rights disputes over the four islands. 
There are several other cases of disputes over territorial sovereignty such as the one between Malaysia and the 
Philippines over Sabah state and the Korean-Japanese dispute over Dokdo (what Japanese call Takeshima). These 
territorial disputes have become pronounced not only because of nominal sovereignty issue, but also because of 
economic interests involving natural resources (e.g., oil) and fishery rights. Ironically, it is with the enforcement of 
the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that these territorial disputes have become all the more salient. Failure to 
resolve these territorial issues in a peaceful manner may well undermine regional stability. Thus, these disputes over 
territorial sovereignty can be considered flash points of regional conflicts in Asia. 
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles was a distinctively Cold War syndrome. However, 
passage of the Cold War has not resolved the security dilemma. Several countries in the region posses, or are on the 
verge of possessing, weapons of mass destruction including nuclear ones. China and Russia are nuclear powers. 
Although the Geneva Agreed Framework halted North Korea’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, North Korea can 
easily turn into a dangerous nuclear spoiler. Japan and South Korea have both technological and economic 
capability to possess nuclear weapons if they are allowed to do so.  In view of this, East Asia can be seen as the most 
volatile region in terms of proliferation of nuclear weapons. Failure to deter nuclear proliferation can, thus, pose a 
major threat to the region as a whole.xxvi 
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Another serious development is recent debates on theater missile defense in Northeast Asia, which became 
intensified since the inauguration of the Bush administration. American efforts to protect its forward deployed 
military assets in East Asia as well as to defend its home land from incoming enemy missiles throughextensive 
networks of missile defense (MD) have produced major negative backlash, undercutting strategic stability in the 
region. MD posits North Korea and China as actual or potential enemies. Such threat perception by the United States 
is about to precipitate new strategic divide in East Asia between the southern axis of U.S.-Japan-South Korea and 
the northern axis of China-Russia-North Korea. The newly emerging strategic divide can drive the entire region to 
the brink of fierce intra-regional arms races.  
Apart from actual potential sources of inter-state conflicts listed above, the East Asian region casts uncertain 
strategic future.xxvii As noted before, the United States has played the most critical role in maintaining strategic 
stability in the region throughout the Cold War era. Even in post-Cold War period, the United States is in the unique 
position to steer regional strategic stability by taking advantage of the unipolar moment. Beneath this overall 
outlook, new tendencies have gradually emerged.  Ambiguous purpose of American power in the region, China’s 
ascending power, Japan’s economic leadership, and Russia’s potential capability make the American hegemony 
questionable, and the future of East Asian regional order has become all the more blurred.  
In this regional equation, the role of the United States seems crucial. If the United States is committed to bilateral 
management of strategic uncertainty, the East Asian regional order might be able to maintain status quo. On the 
contrary, if the United States shifts its policy toward multilateral management of cooperative and common security, 
a new community of security conducive to intra-regional peace-building could emerge. However, if the United 
States disengages from the region without any back-up mechanisms such as regional security cooperation regime, 
East Asia could face an anarchical world of military self-help, finite deterrence, and structural instability. It is for 
this reason that American disengagement from the region and subsequent power vacuum are seen as the major 
source of future regional insecurity. xxviii 
IV Three Visions of Peace and Security in East Asia 
Judged on the above, overall security situation in East Asia does not seem promising. Indeed, peace and stability 
are far away, and managing unstable peace seems to be an immediate imperative. There are several conflict areas 
that can flare up any time.  Military tensions on the Korean peninsula and across the Taiwan Strait are still acute, 
and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction further complicates the prospects for peace in the region. More 
importantly, conflicting perceptions of American forward presence, China’s ascension, and Japan’s remilitarization 
narrow the margin of maneuvering stable peace in the region. Then how to build peace in East Asia? What kinds of 
regional order should be arranged in order to ensure sustainable peace-building? There are at least three contending 
visions on the future of peace and security in East Asia. 
Realist Status Quo 
The most dominant vision is the realist status quo. For its proponents, stable peace is elusive because East Asian 
regional order is deeply anchored in the structure of finite deterrence where regional actors engage in dyadic games 
of mutual suspicion and competition. Such anarchical regional order is bound to accompany unstable peace that can 
be managed only through the logic of deterrence, military power, and alliance politics.  In this regard, status quo is 
the best way to secure peace and stability. Any deviation, be it a break-down in balance of power system or new 
power transition, can precipitate strategic instability, heightening the potential for conflict escalation. Military power 
build-up and alliance politics constitute the core of the realist status quo perspective. Regional security cooperation 
regime is either impossible or merely supplemental to bilateral alliance politics.xxix   
According to the realist view, the continuing forward presence of American forces in East Asia is the best choice 
for sustaining regional strategic stability. For South Korea, bilateral alliance with the United States and its military 
presence is perceived to be vital not only because it can deter war on the Korean peninsula, but also because it can 
prevent power vacuum and subsequent regional hegemonic rivalry between China and Japan. Realists in Japan also 
tend to think in a similar vein since security ties with the United States are the most credible guarantee to check and 
balance actual or potential China threats as well as to cope with potential conflicts with Russia.  Forward deployed 
American forces can not only deter China from undertaking military adventure over Taiwan, but also prevent the 
escalation of territorial and maritime disputes into major overt conflicts.  In addition, American commitment to 
block theproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles can make a significant contribution to regional 
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strategic stability. China, Russia, and North Korea might be concerned about the assertive American position, but 
they have been socialized through the Cold War history and will be willing to compromise American presence.  In 
view of this, a loose form of hegemonic order under American influence where bilateral alliance politics can be 
coordinated through American leadership is the most ideal option for maintaining peace in the region. 
However, effectiveness of the realist status quoapproach is delimited by at least three major drawbacks. First, 
although the realist option might be useful for strategic stability and peace-keeping, it cannot deal with the issues of 
peace-making and peace-building. Managing unstable peace through military deterrence and alliance politics cannot 
lead to a stable peace in the region.  As discussed before, achieving a stable peace requires a different set of 
remedial measures. Second, the realist approach becomes troublesome simply because contrary to its claims, it can 
precipitate new strategic instability in the region. American pursuit of the missile defense initiative (MD) is a 
classical example in this regard. In the process of pushing for the missile defense initiative, the United States has 
posited China, Russia, and North Korea as actual or potential enemies, while strengthening bilateral alliance ties 
with Japan and South Korea. Such move has been responsible for shaping a new strategic divide reminiscent of the 
old Cold War structure between the northern axis (China, Russia, and North Korea) and the southern axis (the U.S., 
Japan, and South Korea), portending a uncertain strategic future in the region. Finally, the realist approach is too 
much America-centered. Excessive dependence on the United States could bring about serious negative boomerang 
effects should the United States disengages from the region, severely jeopardizing peace and security in the region. 
Liberal Transition 
Whereas the realist vision is predicated on a gloomy portrayal of East Asian regional order, proponents of liberal 
transition project a much more optimistic picture. They believe that East Asian countries can escape from the 
trapping structure of security dilemma by forming a community of security as Western European countries have 
done.  But the formation of a community of security should satisfy two pre-conditions. One is region-wide spread of 
free market system, and the other is the enlargement of democratic political structure in East Asia. Shared norms and 
values, increased economic, social, and cultural interdependence, and institutionalized cooperation can remove the 
fear of negative spirals of mutual suspicion, eventually leading to a stable and durable peace in the region. 
Commercial liberalism and democratic peace epitomize the essence of liberal transition perspective. 
According to its proponents, there should be renewed efforts to transform China and North Korea in order to 
realize a durable and stable peace. Democratization of China and North Korea, along with the introduction of market 
economy, can facilitate the diffusion of shared norms and values, ultimately leading to a community of security and 
stable peace. While South Korea hase achieved a mature market economy with a high degree of democratic 
consolidation, Japan is a stable democracy with strong market economy. When and if China and North Korea join 
the liberal camp of democracy and market economy, intra-regional peace-building will be much more plausible. 
Because such developments can foster the rise of open regionalism and intra-regional security cooperation, further 
facilitating the transition to peace in the region. 
There are some positive signs in this regard.  Despite the current stalemate, its proponents strongly believe that 
China and North Korea will eventually embracedemocracy and market economy. China has already made a 
sweeping transition to a market economy over the past two decades.  As evidenced by its recent efforts to join the 
World Trade Organization, China’s integration into the world capitalist economy has been deep and wide, making it 
virtually impossible for China to reverse the trend. For all transitional uncertainty associated with its market 
socialism, China will eventually make a full capitalist transformation. Same can be said of North Korea. Although it 
still remains as the staunchest Stalinist state, North Korea has been gradually showing signs of opening and reform. 
Despite perceived threats to its regime security, North Korean leadership has become much more assertive in 
shifting its foreign and economic policy. The Korean summit in Pyongyang, June 2000, is the most vivid testimony 
to the trend.  Since the summit, the North has been pursuing a reconciliatory policy on the South, aiming at 
promoting economic exchanges and cooperation. And on the occasion of his visit to Shanghai in January, 2001, 
chairman Kim Jong-il expressed his intention to learn from Chinese experiences of opening and reforms. The North 
Korean leadership has been expediting the process of opening and reform by adopting the July 1 administrative 
reform measures in 2002, involving managerial innovation of state enterprises, a realistic pursuit of price, wage, and 
foreign exchange rate, and the adoption of incentive systems can be seen as sincere efforts to overcome the current 
economic difficulties.  Although these measures have entailed enormous negative consequences such as a supply 
bottleneck, spiraling inflation, and deepening income inequality, the North Korean leadership has shown a 
commitment to continuing the process of opening and reforms.xxx  
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Such transformation will inevitably entail concurrent changes in domestic political structure. As historical 
experiences of South Korea  demonstrate, capitalist economic growth is bound to melt authoritarian political 
templates, paving the way to expansion of civil society, the rise of the middle class, culture shifts, and ultimately 
democratic changes. China is full of signs of such changes. Although the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) holds a 
firm grip on political power, local politics in China has undergone remarkable democratic changes. Thus, 
democratization in China is simply a matter of time.  North Korea will be much slower in following the China’s suit 
in sequencing of opening, reforms, and democratization. But it cannot avoid the process. Likewise, spread free 
market and democracy in China and North Korea will make the East Asian region all the more freer and safer. 
Along with these domestic changes, there are other important signs of liberal transition in the region. They are 
growing trends toward multilateral security and economic cooperation. Deepening intra-regional economic 
interdependence has propelled more formal economic cooperation among countries in the region. Joint inter-
governmental efforts among China, Japan, and South Korea to create a Northeast Asia free trade area and to 
establish the Asia Monetary Fund underscore this trend. There is no formal mechanism to address security and peace 
in the region. But East Asian countries have also been active in promoting the idea of multilateral security 
cooperation. The Asian Regional Forum (ARF) is a good example in this regard.  And an array of security dialogues 
among government officials and non-governmental organizations has been instrumental for cultivating a sense of 
epistemic community among regional actors. 
Constructivist Pessimism 
The liberal vision of East Asian regional order can nicely complement drawbacks of the realist approach. 
Common prosperity, shared democratic values, and security community can indeed elevate peace-keeping efforts to 
the level of peace-building. Nevertheless, there is an East Asian anomaly.  Despite shared democratic values, market 
norms, and dense networks of economic, cultural, and social interdependence, mutual perception among East Asian 
countries have not been favorable.  South Korea still dislikes Japan, and is suspicious of China. Japan dislikes South 
Korea, and is suspicious of China. China dislikes Japan, while suspecting motives of a unified Korea. Such circle of 
negative perception anchored in nationalist sentiments not only delimit the scope of liberal persuasion, but also 
dampens the prospects for peace-building in the region.xxxi  
Since the diplomatic normalization in 1965, bilateral ties between Seoul and Tokyo have been widened and 
deepened in all areas. Such inter-connectedness, however, has not accompanied concurrent perceptual changes. 
Japan-South Korean ties have been extremely unstable, being fallen prey to ups and downs in national sentiments. 
For example, since the inauguration of the Kim Dae-jung government in 1998, Japan-South Korean relations 
reached the peak, with the signing of a strategic partnership agreement. But Japan’s ultra-conservative historians’ 
attempts to distort contents of its middle school history textbooks turned the most amicable ties into the worst one. 
Likewise, collective memory of historical past constantly pops out and serves as the negative catalyst in Japan-South 
Korean relations. For all dense bilateral networks and vested economic interests, such perceptual orientation induces 
South Koreans to regard Japan as a primary source of future military threats, especially in the case of American 
disengagement. In a similar vein, Japanese efforts to become a normal state through remilitarization are being 
perceived of as a movement toward militarism.  
China and North Korea share an exactly similar sentiment. Since the early 1970s, China and Japan have become 
closer through various forms of exchanges and cooperation. However, their relationships do not show any 
fundamental improvement.  Sources of this uneasy relationships are not from power and interests, but from 
recognition and identity over the issues pertaining to the colonial past.  As with South Korea, the recent incident 
over Japanese history textbook and lack of Japan’s apology over atrocity in the city of Nanjing have fueled 
widespread anti-Japanese sentiments in China. 
It is with this observation that constructivists argue for limited applicability of the liberal transition thesis in the 
East Asian context.  Diffusion of liberal democracy and market economy cannot heal past scars of colonial 
domination and subjugation.  Historical memory of domination and subjugation has shaped exclusive and even 
combatant collective identity wrapped around nationalism. Collective cognitive dissonance over the reversed 
Confucian order and subsequently changed status are seen as the primary sources of East Asian instability. Such 
collective identity has made the structure of finite deterrence an integral part of conflict system in East Asia. When 
and if the overlay of the Cold War is completely lifted, new patterns of bilateral suspicion and rivalry are likely to 
ensue, complicating the process of peace-building.  For its proponents, identity, rather than power and interests, will 
be a more reliable predictor for strategic interactions among countries in the region. Identity-driven regional politics, 
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as manifested through revival of right-wing nationalism and ramifications in foreign and national security policies, 
is likely to make East Asia more unstable than before. xxxii 
V Conclusion 
The demise of the Cold War has not brought about a stable peace in East Asia. On the contrary, the East Asian 
region now encounters a much more complicated landscape of security dynamics where legacies of the Cold War 
are intricately intertwined with new sources of actual and potential conflicts. Thus, the future of security and peace 
building in East Asia appears to be more uncertain than during the Cold War era. Inertia of the Cold War and built-
in strategic instability, uneven spread of market economy and democracy in the region, and widespread nationalist 
sentiments all challenge the task of building peace and stability in the region. Although the realist regional order is 
conducive to preventing war through deterrence, power, and alliance politics, it cannot materialize a community of 
security and stable peace. Strategic stability, transparency, and predictability are desirable, but not enough to create 
conditions for stable peace.  
The liberal transition perspective also seems defective. No one would deny the importance of democracy and 
market economy as critical preconditions for the realization of stable peace. Homogenizing process of regional 
actors through such common denominators as market economy, democratic values, and a sense of community can 
certainly contribute to enhancing peace and security. Furthermore, liberal institutional arrangements such as 
collective security system, multilateral security cooperation regimes, or total integration are vital to peace-building. 
But such liberal transition cannot be crystallized into concrete peace and security without paying due attention to 
historical and cultural context embedded in East Asia. As protracted ethnic conflicts in Europe illustrate, even 
mature liberal democracy and market economy cannot prevent the rise of malignant nationalism that can fuel new 
patterns of conflicts in the region. 
The constructivist perspective is appealing since it touches on the very core of East Asian regional dynamics. 
What matters is not only structure and process, but also agents.  Collective identity and mind-sets of people have 
served as the major hindrance to peace-building in the region. Collective memory of historical past, abuse and 
misuse of hostile national sentiments for domestic political purposes, and negative amplifying feedback mechanism 
have all contributed to aggravating inter-state relations in East Asia.  But collective identity and cognition are not 
fixed, but vary over time. Past scars can be healed, and collective identity can be unraveled and realigned through 
mutual learning and understanding.  
This refutation leads us to deliberate on new alternatives. The new alternative falls between liberal transition and 
constructivism, what I call liberal constructivism. In building a stable peace, two conditions should be met. As 
proponents of liberal transition argue, diffusion of liberal democracy and market economy are the essential 
prerequisites for peace in the region. Both capitalist peace and democratic peace have universal appeal, and East 
Asia is no exception to it. Domestic check and balance, openness, and increased interactions and cooperation can 
bring about much needed conditions for regional cooperation and peace. But capitalism and democracy are nothing 
but necessary, but insufficient, conditions for peace-building. Past scars should be healed, parochial collective 
identity should be removed, and mutual learning and inter-subjective understanding should guide behavioral patterns 
of countries in the region. Liberal mandates, when combined with deconstruction of old collective identity, can 
liberate the East Asian region from the fear of war and insecurity and lead us to the new horizon of peace and 
security.  
Essential to liberal constructivism are the spirit and institutionalization of cooperation among countries in the 
region as well as the deepening of cross-cultural understanding among their citizens. Cooperation can take several 
forms: multilateral security cooperation, regional preferential trade arrangements, and cultivation of shared values, 
norms, and cultural identity. Concrete measures for such cooperation should be undertaken before mutual distrust 
and rivalry drive the region to the vortex of irreversible and catastrophic conflicts. 
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